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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
1 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Morale on the Offshore Islands

25X1 I. Tachen Defense Command: Prior to the series of Communist attacks on Nationalist positions in the Tachens culminating in the Communist capture of Ichiang on 18 January, troop morale in the Tachen garrison was reported to be good. General Chase, chief of the MAAG on Formosa, who visited the Tachens on 20 December reported that morale of the troops at that time appeared to be high.

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Poor morale at high levels in the Tachen command was also reflected in a report from MAAG that during and after the bombing attack on 10 January the staff spent hours discussing "trivial and various long-term items" to the neglect of the immediate command requirements. The Nationalist naval commander reportedly left his flagship and took refuge on shore after the first air strike.

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25X1 The MAAG group was evacuated from the Tachens on 20 January

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PACOM Review Completed

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II. Matsus: The most recent available report on the Matsu garrison [redacted] does not mention troop morale. [redacted] if the Communists attacked the defenders would be overwhelmed within a few hours unless the garrison were rapidly reinforced. [redacted]

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III. Quemoy: Troop morale in the Quemoy garrison was [redacted] still unaffected by the "uncertainty of the future." Military courtesy (sometimes a good indicator of morale) shown by garrison troops was reported to be the "best of any in the Nationalist army." [redacted]

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HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON
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